


PHILOSOPHY,  
RELIGION AND  
EDUCATION

# CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

*A Christian Journal of Opinion*



## The President's Budget

The increasing opposition to President Eisenhower's budget by members and leaders of both parties reveals some very interesting aspects of the American political scene. The budget is the largest in history, but so is the national income; in proportion the budget is not too large.

Over half of the budget goes for defense costs and the President rightly insists that defense costs cannot be cut until some limitation of armaments, with an adequate inspection, is reached with the Russians. (There are, incidentally, better prospects for such an accord than ever before simply because the burden is too heavy for even the super-nations of America and Russia.) Most of the other items are fixed by law, and many of them, such as veterans' benefits and interest charges, pay for past wars. The item for foreign aid is particularly vulnerable because, as the President declares, its defenders (or at least its beneficiaries) have no votes. Nevertheless, the item of four billion is an infinitesimal part of the total budget. It is a good deal less than the same item in the Democratic budgets of former years and is certainly a vital part of the defense of a very rich nation seeking to preserve tolerable alliances with poor nations. There is, in short, very little wrong with the budget. Why then is it under such violent attack?

The cause must be found partly in the friction between old Republicanism and the "modern" Republicanism of Eisenhower. It was this modern Republicanism which won the election, and some of the present critics of the President rode on his coattails to victory. The confusion about the budget between the old guard and Eisenhower is heightened by the President's personal characteristics which made him so popular, but which also tend to confuse issues.

One of the most dominant traits of his character is that he follows his own insights rather stubbornly, but he does not fight for his position. He is indeed fighting now, perhaps too tardily, as Congress threatens his whole policy by cuts in vital parts of his budget. Thus, the budget controversy has brought the conflict between old and modern Republicanism into the open only a few months after the President's smashing victory.

One aspect of his lack of belligerency is his friendly relationship with the Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, a highly respected man in Washington, but certainly no modern Republican. As the chief fiscal officer of the Administration, he started the revolt against the budget by predicting that such large budgets would cause a depression that would "curl your hair." This represents Neanderthal economics, for almost all economists agree that a balanced budget is not inflationary, no matter what its size. Only unbalanced budgets are inflationary. The President didn't reprove his Secretary or ask him to resign. He declared, in fact, that he partly agreed with him. Then, when the revolt threatened to undo his whole policy, he began to fight and to exploit his tremendous prestige among the people, but perhaps too late. For cutting appropriations is a favorite congressional sport, calculated to gain popularity among the people, who know little about politics but know all the old saws about thrift.

What about the opposition party in this fracas? Logically they should come to the defense of the budget, for it embodies the principles of the welfare state and of international responsibility which the Democrats espoused. But politics is not as logical as that and so the budget is endangered by a com-

bination of old guard Republicans and Democrats. The temptation to curry public favor by cutting expenses was too great to be resisted. The Democrats succumbed to the temptation particularly because Eisenhower, before his election in 1952, had made such extravagant and ignorant promises about both budget cuts and tax cuts that even Bob Taft warned against the irrelevance of the promises.

If we were completely non-political we would be thankful that the President has learned so much in office and is honest enough to follow the insights of his responsibility and experience. But in a political world it is probably inevitable that the opposition party should jeer at the program, however valid, of the man who promised to clean up the "mess in Washington" and who included the cost of government in that mess. Nevertheless, in the long run, the Democrats would be wiser to support the budget rather than to oppose it. For one thing, the security of the nation hangs on the policies incorporated in the budget.

R.N.

## A CHURCH SPEAKS ITS MIND

WE QUOTED in our last issue a few passages from a pronouncement of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the U.S. (the Southern Presbyterian Church). This was a very remarkable statement because it criticized both the whole system of racial segregation and the particular efforts of citizens of the South to maintain this system against the pressures of the Federal courts. Its reference to "numerous 'citizens' groups" will not go unnoticed by many members of the church as an attack on them. This is the third time this body has affirmed its support of the Supreme Court decision, each time by a larger majority than before, in spite of the hardening of feeling in the Assembly's own constituency.

Sometimes church pronouncements are criticized as having little meaning, since they are passed without much consideration by accidental majorities in the last days of a conference, but here we have a case of the most authoritative body in a great church declaring itself after years of full consideration.

Some critics of the church may say that the church becomes more enlightened the greater the distance from the local situation. Local churches of the same denomination in some states would not be likely to say these things. Ministers in local pulpits would risk their chance of having any

local influence if they were to say them with such forthrightness.

This episode illustrates very clearly a fact about church life that needs to be understood: the local church is often less dependable in its ethical judgments than larger units of the church. In the local church there is a tendency for one social interest to be dominant, but in the larger units of the church there are several social interests present which can neutralize each other and prepare the way for a judgment which transcends them and has some claim to be Christian. Instead of being cynical about the fact that people often speak more clearly away from the local situation, we should recognize the sociological realities which underlie this tendency and emphasize the necessity of continued interaction between local congregations and the larger church. From this standpoint we can see how very much mistaken it is to put the major emphasis on the autonomy of the local church. The local church cannot afford to be autonomous, because it greatly needs correction from the experience and insight of other constituencies.

This clear and courageous pronouncement of the General Assembly (all the more remarkable because this is a regional denomination) should give guidance and moral support to all who are struggling locally to break the present stalemate in some states and to find the next step forward for their communities. It is one more blow against the rationalizations of segregation among churchmen.

J.C.B.

### In Our Next Issue

WILLIAM LEE MILLER makes his first contribution since becoming a contributing editor.

"William H. Whyte's excellent book [*The Organization Man*] presents a picture of some modern Americans as, above all, eager to get along with the group, to have fellowship and "togetherness," not to offend anybody, to fit into the needs of the corporation and the suburb without any rough edges of individuality sticking out. He is not speaking merely of a surface "conformity," as when men dressed in interchangeable grey flannel suits drive interchangeable station wagons from interchangeable ranch houses to take interchangeable trains to interchangeable offices to do interchangeable jobs. That doesn't matter so much. What matters is that the men may become interchangeable."

# Internationalism and the Defense of the Existing Status Quo

HERBERT BUTTERFIELD

AFTER World War I there emerged a form of international "idealism" which was gravely weakened by legalistic and pharisaical heresies. It involved a system which was very convenient for the French and the British: it outlawed any attack by external powers on existing empires; it vetoed even international action on issues which such empires might regard as internal; and at the same time it rendered illegitimate for all the future any attempt on the part of a new power to build up similar empires on parallel methods. The resort to violence was condemned without regard to the provocation that might have been given, but protection was assured for imperial systems which were held together only by the latent operation of force. This form of internationalism was bound to function in fact, therefore, as a gigantic machine for the freezing of the *status quo*. An enemy might say of the system that the most unscrupulous experimenter in *Realpolitik* could not have devised a cleverer way of maintaining an empire which lacked the material force for its defense in a competitive world. With their bags full of plunder, France and Britain declared: "There shall be no more competition; there shall be no more stealing now."

## Legalistic Internationalism

The supporters of this type of internationalism were more virtuous than would appear from this account of the system—an account rather from the point of view of those who were not interested in its maintenance. Such supporters were not so clearly conscious of the end which the system served, though they were aware that they were parties to forms of imperialism which could only survive under a regime of stabilization and peace. They were virtuous in a way, for in politics there is some virtue in a power that marries its private interests to a universal cause, an international good. But they were unimaginatively pharisaical, because their internationalism coincided with their vested interests and, therefore, it was comparatively easy for them to be virtuous and to act as lovers of peace. The real test of the virtue of Britain and France was bound to come when they found themselves in a position analogous to that of the Hapsburgs in 1914—when, as declining empires, they would be faced with the decision whether they would con-

sent to go under without making a last desperate fight.

Under the legalistic kind of internationalism described above, it is not possible to prevent issues and problems from developing to the point of desperation. Nor is it possible to prevent occasions from arising which will provide plausible opportunities for violent action on the part of a state or a people that feels itself the victim of injustice. The kind of internationalism which implies the legalistic defense of the *status quo* is, in fact, more calculated to provoke a sudden act of violence than the system of diplomatic relations which existed before 1914 and which allowed for a greater degree of "give-and-take." In the latter case men do learn that it may be necessary to concede something in order to release the tension; they do not simply dig themselves in, relying on the whole international order to halt any attempt to change the *status quo*.

In the hands of men who evaded the real moral issues and who were narrower in their comprehension than so many of the statesmen of the nineteenth century, it is a question whether the established form in internationalism produced a single new idea of any significance between 1919 and 1939. It is a question, in fact, whether before 1914 there did not exist diplomatic methods for meeting crises which were lost or rendered inapplicable owing to legalistic prejudices in the after-period. Let it never be suggested in any case that between 1919 and 1939 a regime was established in Europe which made it more difficult for aggressors and dictators to arise—more difficult for men to resort to the politics of the *coup d'état* or to take the world by surprise—than in the preceding generations.

The Franco-British adventure in the Suez has taken the mask away from the internationalism which seeks to "police" the *status quo*. But the leaders of the Suez enterprise have perhaps been too uncharitably condemned, for they merely brought the older system to its climax (which happens also to be its *reductio ad absurdum*)—they merely carried a stage further the kind of policy they had been pursuing all their lives. Precisely because it was one of the points of weakness in the older system, "colonialism" has become a primary issue, and three large sections of the globe—the Communists, the United States and the Afro-Asian bloc—have made their separate and varying attacks upon that order of things. And the fact that Britain feels that she has conceded much already, and that she has performed

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many acts of generosity, is no answer to those who insist that she had no right to what she possessed, no right to the things which she was pretending to give away. Colonies do not present the only issue, however, and Nasser's own attack has been extended against very indirect forms of "colonialism;" nor is it clear that he would allow himself to be humoured or bribed into becoming a satellite of the West, which after all is not so very different a matter. The point is that we are all in the position of Metternich—and Time is bound to be against us—if, in the face of the new forces that have emerged in the world, we merely seek to hold the fort, to dam the flood, to cling to the existing *status quo*.

### Changing the Status Quo

There are some who believe that time and custom, prescriptive right and continuity of possession, are good grounds for retaining territory or economic privileges or various forms of property. The war of 1914—in its effects on the Hapsburg Empire or on Germany's overseas possessions, for example—shook the very basis of such "legitimist" doctrine; and in a wider sense France and Britain should have the credit for the democratic ideas and the nationalist teaching which are working to their detriment at the present day.

We are still faced with the question: how can we have an international order that will not simply freeze the *status quo* by its legalistic insistence on the sanctity of the existing order? Even in the eighteenth century it was recognized that the internal development (perhaps the economic development) of one state or another might change the distribution of power in the world and change even the distribution of rights, so that treaties would need revision. Today the existence of an international order depends on our discovery of some method (other than war or revolution or similar acts of violence) for the changing of the *status quo*.

The Communists are bound to have the strategic advantage if they are promoting change, with the wind at their back, while the Western powers are desperately struggling merely to keep the barriers firm. Since public opinion, or world opinion, or the opinion of governments in general has become a powerful factor in the situation, and since the West must depend very much on capturing the opinion and the sympathy of what might be called the uncommitted powers, our future is going to depend on the kind of internationalism which does not attempt to freeze the existing situation in a legalistic manner but takes the lead in predicting and preparing the necessary changes in the *status quo*.

On this view England and France were at fault in that, years ago, they did not foresee how precarious was their situation in the Suez. They ought to have placed the Canal on an international basis so clear and unobjectionable that Nasser would have had neither the motive nor the opportunity for behaving as he did in 1956.

One of the dangers presented by the Afro-Asian peoples—and indeed by all countries which are newly-awakened—is that of excessive nationalism. Yet excessive nationalism is just one of those things which expand through any effort to repress them; it is quickened by any suggestion of "colonialism" and stimulated even by the memory of such a thing, and it resents paternalist treatment. There is poor hope for the world if the newly-arisen peoples share the infatuations and make the mistakes which characterized the European states at the period when they were at the same stage of development, the same stage of political consciousness.

Yet while the Afro-Asian peoples are still in a sense unachieved—still not formidable as autonomous and well-constituted powers—there is always a danger that if the Western nations withdraw their interest from them, a vacuum will be formed, a vacuum which Soviet Russia will infallibly try to fill. If "colonialism" exists it provokes resentment; if it exists merely in economic forms that seem more appropriate to our age it is still going to lead to difficulties, and danger is going to arise if the Western nations imagine that all problems can be solved by the power of money. It would be to our interests if the Arab nations were thoroughly modern states, completely independent and autonomous. In fact, their genuine transformation and development are things that cannot happen as quickly as we want them to happen. If they were free, strong, independent modern states, or if they formed a powerful autonomous bloc, the great Russian mass is so very much on the top of them and the danger of the Communist kind of "colonialism" is so real, that nothing could prevent their being on our side in the event of a conflict with communism. Nothing could prevent their being on our side except the suspicion that we retained designs of direct or indirect "colonialism" or the memory of humiliations suffered in the past.

The genius of Britain, discovered both in the internal relations of the home country and in the various parts of its actual Empire, is a curiously flexible method for the changing of the *status quo*—a method which prevented crises from reaching the desperation point, ensured the gradual development of liberty, and provided a model of the kind

of change which is just in time to anticipate the resort to violence. It has never been easy to secure the extension of the same technique to the realm of international affairs; and in some respects it is possible that the traditional diplomatic methods (or a continuation of the development they were undergoing already) was more capable of the required flexibility than the legalistic methods which tended

to characterize the more recent types of internationalism. This would seem to be one of the things which the world requires at the present day. And a Christianity that disengages itself from the defense of the *status quo* is well fitted to carry on the required conflict—the fundamental moral conflict of our time—the conflict against legalistic and pharisaical notions of righteousness.

## The Dramas of France

TO EXAMINE the international scene from the French point of view is a difficult task, because there are several French points of view, sometimes contradictory. This is not specifically linked to the well-known individualism of this people, but to a conjunction of circumstances which makes France live in an atmosphere of drama. There are dramas centered in various parts of the planet. Let us say that France is at the center of the European drama and is bound both to the relative decline of Europe in the world and to some phenomena peculiarly French.

### The Drama of Past and Future

If there are static nations and dynamic nations, one can say that France was rigorously static, immobile and inflexible between the two world wars: 1,400,000 young men killed from 1914 to 1918—this crushed a generation. One thought only of political and economic security. The spirit of the Maginot Line, of appeasement, of blind pacifism, were bound up with this formidable blood-letting. On the other hand, World War II, in spite of the 625,000 deaths which it caused in France (almost three times America's losses in a country of one-fourth the population), curiously brought about an extraordinary renewal of dynamism.

The clearest indication of the vitality of a developed nation is the vigor of its birth rate, sign of hope for the future. (This is not true of underdeveloped countries where the phenomenon, linked to the lack of education, is of a more physiological order.) The French birth rate, which in 1938 no longer compensated deaths, has abruptly and consistently gone up again. The surplus since 1946 has been 300,000 per year—more than Italy and West Germany—and there is no sign of any marked decline.

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J. B. DUROSELLE

But this people, on the way toward rejuvenation, finds itself with relatively few workers for its many children and its many old people. Moreover, this dynamic nation—and she will be even more so in ten years when the new generations have reached adulthood—restored to herself in 1946 the political institutions of an old, static and prosperous nation. Whence the growing tension between the vital forces and an outmoded, inefficient political apparatus which conspicuously leans on the most routine forces of conservatism: the older sectors of the economy, retarded industries, backward agricultural regions, which are desperately defending themselves with the outbursts of fury of which Poujadism was a surprising and ephemeral expression. These wield an influence on the government which is considerably exaggerated in comparison to their actual strength. This rending estrangement between the forces of the past and those of the future is the first drama of France.

### ... of Isolation and Interdependence

At the very moment this drama is playing, the distribution of power in the world has been upset. It is no longer divided, as in the thirties, among seven approximately equal powers, but between two super-states. A single H-bomb is more powerful than all the French air force together. It is quite certain that the notion of prestige, so important in the diplomacy of the nineteenth century, has today suffered a marked decline. Governments orient their policies more and more toward the improvement of standards of living—the standard of material life, the standard of cultural life, and less and less toward the cares of glory. The Swiss ideal, only recently looked down upon, today seems superior to the Bonapartist ideal. But one does not pass from Napoleon to Candide without experiencing a rending estrangement.

There was among certain Frenchmen, of whom General deGaulle was the noble symbol, the will

to pull out from the ashes and debris of defeat a new "policy of grandeur." But is this possible for a France isolated, enclosed in an inherited pride of the past? "Yes," say those who envisage a break with the United Nations, a break with the Atlantic Pact and the inauguration of a new form, however dangerous, of "splendid isolation." "No," say others, more sensitive to the growing interdependence of the world; France must dissolve herself in a greater fatherland, Western Europe. She must consolidate her anti-Communist alliance and for this end accept sacrifices. Between the isolationists—whether they be "Europeans," "Atlantics," or the faithful to the United Nations—there still exists a rending estrangement, and this is the second drama of France.

#### **... of Empire and Colonial Peoples**

Paralleling these two dramas, a third is developing, linked to the soaring rise of nationalisms in the former colonies. One will note that in the ex-French Empire these have made their appearance later than elsewhere, in some cases only at the end of World War II. Let us say that the dream of numerous Frenchmen was to orient the Empire toward progressive assimilation and (the French being scarcely race conscious) to melt the whole into one great people. Numerous native leaders believed this policy feasible. And it would be ignoring the historical truth to forget that tens of thousands of North African soldiers, like the French soldiers of the homeland, with whole-hearted devotion died for France.

But it would be ignoring another historical truth to have believed this a stable situation. The French universities had taught the native elite that human dignity is a supreme value. But is not national independence, already on the road to realization in the other empires, a surer and more rapid road to the achievement of human dignity than is assimilation? Assimilation is really possible only where there is an equal standard of living. Yet France, ruined by two wars, is no longer in a position to assure her own level of life to colonial populations. It is necessary then to choose, and this choice—where wisdom is distressing, where the memories of the past collide with present realities—constitutes the third drama of France, a drama to which Dienbienphu was the tragic testimony.

#### **... of Communism**

Finally, there is the drama of communism. It is easy in the United States, where communism is

principally a concern of a very small group of intellectuals, to simplify the problem. In France, communism is a concern of masses, and a notable part of the working class votes Communist, though certainly not on account of foreign policy, but in consequence of an attitude of class solidarity. They see in the Communist promise to destroy the "bourgeois state" and replace it with the "proletarian state" the surest means to assure the workers of a better standard of living and a greater dignity. There is only something very noble here, nothing else.

Only it happens that communism finds itself tied to the prodigious upward flight of a vast socialist state, the U. S. S. R., the immense resources of which—exploited by an active and intelligent people enclosed by a dictatorship of iron—have given it a considerable portion of industrial and military power. Against this power, precisely because of its dictatorship and its imperialism, there is no doubt that the French (including the Communist voters, as various polls have proven) would have no desire to stand alone in their own defense. The Atlantic Pact, discounting certain propaganda, is hardly debated.

But the very presence of 25% Communist voters renders this defense more distressing. Among the Atlantic nations, France is without doubt (with Italy) the most eager for an East-West rapprochement. There the idea of peaceful coexistence—a bit naive for one who knows Marxist Leninist doctrine—is greatly cherished and coveted. Public opinion follows with passionate interest the apparent concessions of the Soviets. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. was greeted in France as a great hope. The Hungarian drama, on the contrary, did not bring a rending estrangement to the French only because it marked the crushing of a proud people by its pitiless master, but also because it shattered that hope by revealing all its fallaciousness. And this is the fourth drama of France.

This overall situation of drama certainly explains the incoherences of French politics: how, after having launched the European idea, France rejected the E. D. C.; how she is at the same time the initiator of the common market and the country of quotas and customs barriers; how, having belatedly granted independence to Indo-China, to Tunisia, and to Morocco, she refuses it to Algeria—supported on this point, it is true, by the 1,200,000 European Frenchmen who live in that country; how she is at the same time devoted to the Atlantic Pact and attracted by neutralism.

## French Policy in Outline

But rather than cavil at these incoherences—which, after all, France is not the only one to manifest—it seems of greater interest to survey the broad outlines toward which, under the pressure of a more and more dynamic and confident public opinion, the policy of French governments is being oriented. Let us be satisfied to distinguish the principal points.

(1) French fidelity to the Atlantic alliance is not menaced. But France will work to transform the anti-Communist alliance into a community of interests. Public opinion has sharply resented the attitude of the United States in the Suez affair since July, 1956. She certainly admits that Americans, with their world responsibilities, should try to win the neutral and even the neutralist countries. But she is convinced that one will not achieve this by a policy of appeasement. She questions the decision launching the Franco-British military operation, which has been condemned by its very failure. But she questions still more bitterly the method utilized by the U. S. A. in this affair. Moreover, let us note that the Hungarian affair rendered the French more conscious of the impossibility of any real peaceful coexistence.

(2) But France has preoccupations other than the struggle against communism. At the head of her worries comes the future of her former Empire, notably Algeria. To a growing number of Frenchmen, it seems evident that the independence of Algeria is inescapable. Still, it is necessary to protect the European Frenchmen who live there. Perhaps one ought to resign oneself temporarily to a solution of compromise, foreseeing several stages in the granting of independence. But the major care of the French government must be maintenance of economic and cultural ties with all of North Africa, ties without which the economy of these countries would be ruined, thereby giving rise to disorder and providing the Communists with every facility to establish their dominion there. Strategically, the West also has need of North Africa.

(3) Another essential preoccupation is the concern to procure industrial power, in which France, little favored by nature, is deficient and will be much more deficient, now that her industrial production is in full swing (an 11% increase in 1956 being more than that of any other country of Western Europe). To resolve this problem there are, on the one hand, the probably immense resources of the Sahara—"France's big chance." This supposes a solution of the Algerian problem. On the other hand, there is atomic energy. In this field,

France, presently ranking fourth in the world, does not intend to remain outdistanced—whence an investment plan of 400 billion francs and adherence to "Euratom."

(4) Finally, the Suez affair and its failure have revealed that the independence of France is a small thing when the great powers intervene against her. Let us imagine that atomic protection by the U. S. A. ceases. How would we make up for it? There exist two solutions which are in no way contradictory. The first is the building of a stockpile of atomic arms—while trying to the maximum, in order to avoid expense, to obtain aid in this area from the American allies. The second consists of taking new steps toward the reinforcement of the European association, a prelude to a more distant European integration. It is thus that the treaty instituting the common market, for which there appears little doubt of French ratification, ought to be considered much more a political operation than a simple economic enterprise.

In this Europe where, in the absence of actual power, the creative forces are considerable, France plays a role which remains essential, a role tied to her geography, to her culture, and to her underlying resources. France is an old country which has understood the dangers of unbounded nationalist fever. She is also a young country with a decided personality. The full playing of her role is especially hampered by her lack of a good system of government. But the essential thing is that public opinion is beginning to be conscious of it.

## CORRESPONDENCE

### "Occidental Centrism"

*The writer of the following letter, an Indian, is professor of World Christianity at the Colgate Rochester Divinity School.*

**TO THE EDITORS:** I have been following with keenest interest and concern the discussions bearing on the Middle East crisis that have appeared in recent months in *Christianity and Crisis*. As one interested in a responsible Christian approach to international affairs, irrespective of one's nationality, I was not only sorely disappointed but was often made deeply anxious by the attitudes reflected by the so-called "realist" group of thinkers on international affairs.

If the "realist" group pretended no claims to Christian affiliation my concern would not have been as great as it was, but with Reinhold Niebuhr (whom many even in the Orient consider a Christian spokesman) in the group, I could not help being so concerned. Let me say, lest I be misunderstood, that I do not believe that there is an absolute Christian answer to any of our political problems, but this does not absolve a Christian from the responsibility of seeking for justice, not

merely with reference to the interests of one group but with reference to the competing claims of all the groups involved in a conflict.

I could not help feeling that thinking of the "realist" group was dominated by an unfortunate tendency to what I might call, "occidental centrism." This is a luxury which even on an entirely realistic basis, apart from all moral questions, the West can no longer afford. The "realist" group may repudiate the charge and contend that what they are genuinely interested in is the preservation of conditions for a free way of life in the world and that, with all their sympathies for the aspirations of the new independent nations, they cannot contemplate the disintegration of power represented by the alignment of the free nations of the Western world, for this power alone is the safeguard against international communism. If in our present day world the total repudiation of power is unreal and naive, the overweening dependence on power is equally unreal and naive.

Those of us who have lived all our lives in the East and have been participants in the breathtaking changes that have taken place in the last few years know only too well that power in itself is no guarantee against the penetration of influences that are destructive of a democratic way of life. It seems to me that the "realist" group tends to forget that there is an ideological struggle going on in the world and that this struggle cannot be won with the aid of mere power.

Secondly, if all the virtues claimed for the more desirable of the two ideologies in the struggle are not discerned to be there by the power-less but intensely interested and committed spectators (a paradox but true), one cannot predict the end of the struggle on the basis of a balance of power. The committed spectators may be excused if they think that the ideological struggle, in fact, is not merely between two groups of ideologies, but between three or more. In other words, it is not

even prudent to ignore certain moral aspects (even on a temporary basis) of some of our present world conflicts. The attitudes represented by the "realist" group could not be more naively unreal than when ignoring the tremendous forces at work in the lives of the nations of the East. To dismiss these forces as due merely to some irrational upsurge of nationalism is even worse—it is political irresponsibility.

But I am inclined to think that neither of these charges is fair to the "realist" group. Their reading of history may be at fault and their arguments suggest that their vision is circumscribed by a tendency to "occidental centrism," and this the reason why we welcome the article by Dr. Eduard Heimann in the May 13 issue of *Christianity and Crisis*. Dr. Heimann provides grounds for Christians, both from the East and the West, to come together to discover common Christian responsible attitudes, even if they should hurt our nationalistic sentiments.

V. E. DEVADUTT  
Rochester, N. Y.

### Niebuhr in Outline

TO THE EDITORS: About ten years ago Will Herberg prepared a thirty-page outline on "The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr." A number of copies of this outline still happen to be available, and it was thought that some of the readers of *Christianity and Crisis* might like to secure one. A copy may be obtained by sending 25c to the writer of this letter at Union Theological Seminary, 3041 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.

Robert T. Handy  
New York, N. Y.

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